This book is lacking in length and in depth of analysis. To say this book is 144 pages long is stretching things. The Epilogue ends on page 104; at least 20 pages (a conservative estimate, I think) before this are occupied by maps and/or photos. This leaves only about 85 pages of text. In reality, GETTYSBURG'S FORGOTTEN CAVALRY ACTIONS resembles a lengthy article more than it does a book. One stylistic criticism is the author's excessive use of long block quotes, which often disrupt his narrative.

A great book that dispels the notion that the heroes at Gettysburg are all remembered today. The reader will never forget the description of the ill fated charge led by Farnsworth at the insistence of Justin Kilpatrick. Very easy to read and engrossing.

"Gettysburg's Forgotten Cavalry Actions", by Eric J. Wittenberg, is an important new book on the Gettysburg Campaign. It covers, in much detail and under one cover, the vital cavalry actions which occurred on the southern fields of that battle which so long have remained obscure to most Civil war enthusiasts.

This isn't more Gettysburg "fluff" or rehashed stories to sell a book; far from it. "Gettysburg's Forgotten Cavalry Actions" is a riveting, well-researched narrative of the heroic operations of several of the Union's fastest rising cavalry "stars" at that monumental conflict.

While Custer fought on the more well-known "East Cavalry Field" against JEB Stuart, Wesley Merritt and Elon Farnsworth performed no less brilliantly against Southern forces south and west of Little Round Top.

In a number of vicious clashes between cavalry and Rebel infantry, Farnsworth displayed unmatched heroism while Merritt gave Mea! de a possible yet fleeting opportunity to damage Lee's army severely after the repulse of Pickett's Charge.

Any Civil War cavalry buff will want to read this story. But, for all Gettysburg enthusiasts, it should be considered "required reading" as it fills-in nicely an area of battle historiography which has long been neglected. You can't lose on this one!

Theodore C. Mahr. Former National Park Service Historian. Author of: "The Battle of Cedar Creek: Showdown in the Shenandoah..." and forthcoming works on the Cavalry Battles of the Overland Campaign.

Counterfactual history, often poohed by academicians, is a popular topic for story - tellers, and the American Civil War one of the popular historic topics for writers of all specializations. And what is more popular then speculating, what might have happened, if alternate decisions during Gettysburg Campaign had produced a different outcome ? How might a different the outcome have affected American history, or even the fate of the world, if the South had been victorious in these crucial three days in summer 1863 ? Or what else could have happened in the rolling hills of Pennsylvania ?

The editors have charged a dozen-odd writers of different background to think and write with these questions in mind. Some of the stories stay in the realm of counterfactual history and point to the fact, that only a few different decisions or developments may well have altered the whole course of events. For anybody interested in military history, these chapters - like well known military writer Harold Coyle's "Sedwick's Charge" or Doug Allyn's Custer's First Stand - will attract attention, as well as the concluding essays, which investigate the potential for alternate developments during the Gettysburg Campaign and beyond this narrow window over the whole war.

Of the more fictional and literary stories, one explores the impact of a completely different Gettysburg Address, another one muses about the murder of Abraham Lincoln and even touch the realm of science fiction in a piece about how powerful contemporary events may interact and even change century old historic facts. This one certainly one of the best pieces of the volume, the overall quality is varying strongly from excellent reading stuff over intriguing essays on alternate history to some outright dull and uninspired texts.

All together, "Alternate Gettysburgs" is a recommendable addition to any wargamer's or civil war buff's library, a good companion for week-end trip to the Battlefield Park or just an occasional dip into what is the arguably most covered and researched conflict in human history.

It is not surprising that alternative history stories about the United States are intrigued by the possibilities offered by the Civil War, or that the Battle of Gettysburg is the focal point of such speculations, or that Pickett's charge is most often considered as the pivotal moment. I remember watching war gamers playing out the Battle of Gettysburg on an immense map, and, of course, those playing the Confederates immediately took the high group on Culps Hill, Cemetery Ridge, and the Round Tops and tried to slaughter the Army of the Potomac as it arrived upon the scene. "Alternate: Gettysburgs" is an uneven collection of short stories and essays focusing on various visions of what might have been with a key change here or there.

Actually, few of the stories deal with Pickett's charge, but it is clearly the pivotal event of the battle. Harold Coyle does a reversal by having the charge abandoned and having the Federals try "Sedgwick's Charge" instead. Doug Allyn's "Custer's First Stand" has the flamboyant cavalry officer making a foolish mistake in trying to stop Jeb Stuart from attacking the Union rear during the charge. Probably the oddest story in the collection, with its combination of history and science fiction, William H. Keith, Jr.'s "In the Bubble" takes wargaming to its ultimate level. "The High-Water Mark" by Brendan DuBois tweaks history a bit to turn the Civil War into a World War. Most of the stories include afterwords from the authors explaining their points of departure from history.

Two of the stories deal with the Gettysburg Address. "The Blood of the Fallen" by James M. Reasoner has Lincoln giving a different speech at the dedication of the National Cemetery because in this alternative world his son Tad dies from his fever. I especially liked Kristine Kathryn Rusch's "Well-Chosen Words," because as a rhetorician I appreciate her point that the Gettyburg Address might be Lincoln's most famous speech but he gave another one of equal importance (both of which, I should note, are etched in marble on opposite ends of the Lincoln Memorial).

Other stories are set in the alternative future of a world in which the Confederacy won the Civil War. Simon Hawke's "A Gun for Johnny Reb," is one of the few to try and ground the alterations in something beyond wishful hoping, offering a more realistic version of Turtledove's novel "The Guns of the South." Certainly there are hits and misses throughout the book, but surely there are enough intriguing tales to make reading this book worthwhile for Civil War buffs.

Ironically, the best part of the book for me was the closing essay by William R. Fortschen, "Lee's Victory at Gettysburg...And Then What?" which throws cold water on the idea that a Confederate victory then and there would have changed the outcome of the war. Fortschen argues that a Confederate victory on the second day would have been more probable (suggesting that a 15 minute break to fill empty canteens with water would have given the Rebels enough strength to take Little Round Top and turn the Union left), but then makes a totally convincing case that the Army of Northern Virginia would never have been able to take Washington, D.C. I must admit this appeals to me because I wrote a short story once about a white supremacist who had a time machine built and was going to go back and change things so the Confederacy won the Civil War. He could only take one trip and as he sits in the time machine ready to go he has to pick the moment, but nothing he can come up with would guarantee success and so he just sits there. So, yes, I am in total agreement with Fortschen's argument. Other essays in the appendix section of "Alternate Gettysburgs" provide an overview of the battle, a look at the politics of war, and the social convictions of both sides surrounding the battle.

Alternative histories, as a general rule, seem to suffer from what I want to call historical echoes. I mean this to signify that even as an author goes off in a decidedly different direction, "real" events manage to make their way back into the tales. Thus, for example, a general will die at Gettysburg the same way he did a year later, or a fictional presidential assassination will be eerily similar to a historical one. Ironically, then, the best alternative histories are those that are able to truly break free of what really happened and indulge themselves in fanciful flights of "what if."

I enjoy alternate history, and the what-ifs of crucial events in history, and Gettysburg seemed a very good place to write about, and thought that this collection of short stories would be fairly good. I was somewhat erroneous. The majority of stories in this book are average, but there are a couple of really bad short stories in this book.
One of these such stories is the first story in the book: Sedgwick's Charge, written by Harold Coyle. The story is about Longstreet's decision to stop Pickett's charge, and the Union general Sedgewick then thinks he finds his chance to destroy the retreating Confederate army. But, it wasn't the concept of the story that was disappointing, but the execution and writing style of Coyle. He uses too man company names, and numbers, instead of focusing on the action that the story is trying to portray.
The rest were good premises, but a number of them had writing styles that were a bit lacking. The reason I gave this book 4-stars was because the few above-average stories in this book really make it better. Overall, it's an okay book that has a few commendable short stories in it. It also has a brief overview of the battle of Gettysburg, politics at the time, etc. in the back of the book which is quite tedious to read when you're done the stories (I think they put it into the book to take up space because they couldn't find enough writers to put stories into his book). I would suggest reading this book, but possibly skipping over the tedious parts which I mentioned, because they really detract from the book's value as something to have on your shelf.

I love artillery, and the Civil War, and I was predisposed to like this book. I wanted to like it. But I failed. There is a lot of good and interesting information in this book, and the author does seem to know his subject (though there are gaps, for example his flawed understanding of the contruction of a wooden wheel). His themes as to the importance and use of artillery are well worth examining. But its all spoiled by the bad writing. It is turgid, the sentences are complex and sometimes obscure - the author sometimes seems to lose track of what he meant to say when he started. It is also occasionally repetitive. The English is at about the level of a good High-School theme paper, but it isn't good enough for a published work. Its a shame, too; if Mr. Cole couldn't buff up his English for publication, he surely could have found someone (like the publisher, Da Capo Press!) to do it for him. That's what editors are for.
So would I recommend this book? Well, I'm not going to give the book to Salvation Army, but I don't know if I'd buy it again either. So perhaps that is a very guarded recommendation, if your level of interest is very high.

James D. Gray

In some ways the book's title -- "Civil War Artillery at Gettysburg" -- is a little misleading or at least overly self-limiting. Most of the book is devoted to discussing Civil War artillery as a subjectin itself; only in the next-to-last chapter does the focus shift to the battle of Gettysburg, and even then there is a good deal of information about artillery in general rather than Gettysburg specifics. I do not say this as a criticism of Philip Cole's book, because it serves a very useful purpose in providing a good overview of Civil War artillery in general, with much of what it has to say as applicable for Antietam or Chickamauga as to Gettysburg. If you are looking for accessible descriptions of the guns, ammunition, capabilities, and tactics, then this fits the bill. I had recent occasion to try to track down what seemed to be a simple enough fact -- what was the muzzle velocity of a standard 3-inch rifled cannon? -- and I checked every place I could think of, including Ordnance Department manuals, Civil War artillerist's drill manuals, and books on Civil War weapons and equipment. And I came up blank. Nothing had the desired information, until I picked up Philip Cole's book and there it was (1215 feet per second, in case you are wonderding).

So, I would defintely recommend this book for anyone wanting to learn about Civil War artillery. It's not just for those interested in Gettysburg.

As an artillery officer who studies Civil War artillery pretty intently, has been published in Field Artillery Journal and America's Civil War Magazine, and who has led several staff rides at Gettysburg, I found Phil Cole's book to be quite helpful. This is a must read for any person who wants to learn what it was like to be a Civil War-era artillerist. Mr. Cole generally uses examples of the Gettysburg Campaign to explain artillery tactics, techniques, and procedures. He also offers some reasonable conclusions about how the battle was fought and persuasively argues the centrality of the long arm in all operations. So buy this book now, get Coco's little book on Gettysburg artillery, the new book on the Stuart Artillery (Galloping Thunder), Van Loan Naisawald's treatise on the artillery in the Army of the Potomac, and the book on Cushing, synthesis them, and get out to the Burg to do some serious terrain analyses! After that, go see your local National Guard recruiter and join the artillery!

This is an excellent volume; the introduction alone is
practically worth the price of the book. It is an accurate and
unflinching look at the town of Gettysburg and its history and
development since the battle. It will probably be unpopular
with the faction who prefer their history sugarcoated and
uncritical, but for those who seek the real history, this is it.
For many, Gettysburg has become a shrine to be revered, a
veritable home of saints and holy relics. This book looks at the complete picture, "warts and all," and it will especially
resonate with the "baby boomer" generation who came of age in the 1950's and 1960's. An excellent study and a fine
addition to the Gettysburg canon!

This is the best account of the evolution of a historic site during its "museum period" that I've read. It traces the development of the site through four periods following the actual battle to the present day, recounting how diverse and often competing "producers" defined and re-defined its meaning in response to changes in America's consumer culture. This is a minor masterpiece in the growing literature on collective memory and public history.

"A Reader from the United States" couldn't be more wrong about
"Gettysburg" by Jim Weeks. It is the best discussion I've read of the evolution of an important historic site withiin the context of America's culture of consumption. It is especially good on the craze for "authenticity" that has developed since the 1970s, which is probably why "Reader" dislikes the book since he/she sounds like a reenactor. This is a worthwhile book that anyone interested in public history should read.

Edited by Gary W. Gallagher, The First Day at Gettysburg offers several fresh looks at leadership from both Union and Confederate perspectives. As an essay book, it quite naturally should cover topics that are controversial, yet the essays in this book seem to dance around the issues and not really make a firm statement. With the exception of A. Wilson Greene, the authors of these essays do not take a clear position and provide evidence to support that position. The first two essays by Alan Nolan and Gallagher ruminate on the Confederate high command's leadership on July 1st. Nolan attempts to show that Lee did not give enough direction to the Confederate movements on that day, and that this is what led to heavy casualties and incomplete victory. Nolan gives a very good, succinct account of Lee's reasons for invasion, and the decisions that led to a battle on July 1, 1863. However, he fails to prove that Lee did not provide leadership, and actually spends most of his writing discussing A.P. Hill and Richard Ewell. From his writing, it appears that Nolan does not fully believe what he is trying to prove, but is instead writing according to his reputation as a Lee detractor. Gallagher falls into a similar trap in discussing the leadership of Hill and Ewell. While he is more on topic, he spends an inordinate amount of time discussing Lee-something that Nolan should have done. His conclusions are not definite, and he does not offer any view of the two generals that has not already been discussed at length. Robert Krick's essay seems out of place in this book. He concentrates on three incidents of poor brigade leadership in the Confederate army. While interesting to read, he does not show how these failures altered the outcome of the first day. Also, his obsession with Jackson is very clear and detracts from the point of the essay. It seems that the three essayists on Confederate leadership keep coming back to the Jackson question, but it is most out of place in Krick's writing. It is fun to ask what if, however it does not deserve a place in a supposedly analytical book. Only Greene seems to accomplish his goal in his essay. He methodically shows that the reputation of the Eleventh Corps and its much-maligned commander was misplaced. This is the sort of writing that is to be expected in such a book-fresh, insightful, and informative, not merely a recitation of facts that many people already are aware of. Though an excellent look at what happened on July 1, 1863, just west of Gettysburg, The First Day at Gettysburg, does not answer the why questions nor provide any new perspectives on the action that occurred. In this way, the book fails to accomplish its purpose.

A good look at the leadership during the first chaotic day at the battle of Gettysburg. Robert Krick's "Three Confederate Disasters on Oak Ridge" was my favorite reading of the four. I do wish there was a reading on Doubleday and his command after Reynolds was killed. I would recommend this to anyone with a knowledge of the Battle of Gettysburg who would like four new looks at General leadership.

Instead of overstated positioning and endless biography, Civil War Historian Gary Gallagher and other noted historians have come together to offer their views on various leadership tactics involved during the first day of battle. Alan Nolan covers Confederate strategy and Lee's leadership role in the Pennsylvania campaign how certain maneuvers lead to dire consequences. Gary Gallagher offers his thoughts in the role of A.P. Hill and Richard Ewell and questions their leadership during the fighting. Could they have been more involved? Did they listen to Lee's orders? Was Ewell fairly treated in his reasons for not advancing further on the late afternoon of the 1st? Gallagher opens and answers these questions while prompting new insight.

Wilson Green explores Union tactics and leadership involving Howard and the 11th Corp operations. Did Howard coordinate and properly lead this Corp at Gettysburg? Could disaster been avoided? Robert Krick brings to life the failure of Heth's approach in bringing in his weakest brigade, Iverson and Oneal's poor executions leading to disastrous failures along Oak Ridge.

Finally, this book isn't for those just looking to understand the 1st Day, it is for those who have a higher knowledge of the the battle and are looking for answers in regards the above mentioned. Does it get in to all of the issues of the 1st Day? No. It does exactly what the cover says, it explores leadership on popular issues.

This book is the third in a series of essays on the Gettysburg battle and as much as I thoroughly enjoyed the First day and the Third, this book is my least favorite. Although, Gallagher as usual writes a very fair and well researched essay on REL and his reasoning and actions at Gettysburg, the remaining three authors are a little too narrow in scope on their topic or in the case of Krick to eager to harpoon the great white whale. Gallagher has the best essay as he explains Lee's position, options and reasoning in a very logical format. He also underlines well Lee's interactions with his generals.

It was very disappointing that Krick who is a tremendously well researched writer on Jackson and who adores him writes the critical essay on Longstreet who Krick has a long history of open disgust. Krick starts off his essay with a collection of everything ugly that was ever said about Longstreet to incredulous proportions that he even includes the relatively few comments made by Longstreet's trusted subordinates. Often quoting McLaws who called Longstreet a "great big humbug", in contrast it was noted in Jeffery Wertz's more recent book that recently discovered documentation between Longstreet and McLaws indicated that Lee wanted Longstreet to either ride McLaws hard to keep him from being lethargic or lose him, which may explain the strains in their relationship. It's no secret that Longstreet was not motivated for a frontal assault and he is taken to task for trying to conceal moving 20,000 men from an open field although I would agree he could have done it more effectively. Krick roasts Longstreet every which way, he criticizes him for not embracing Lee's attack plan and arguing but then beats him up for refusing Hood's last minute desire to flank the round tops. By this time, Longstreet played Lee too long for the same request thus he ordered the attack a fact Longstreet never hid even in his writings; however, poorly written. Krick in effect makes Longstreet look like such a dolt that it reflects negatively on Lee, as if he was incapable of either command or command changes. Looking at the number of officers that Lee moved out after the Seven days and at Antietam, Lee could and did reassign anyone that displeased him. The second day was the heaviest fighting on the field and in spite of the Union position; the First Corp almost breaks through. This should have been the best and most critical essay in the book and I think more even handed in the analysis.

The remaining two essays maintain a more narrow scope. Greene expertly explains the bewildering day of Slocum and the 12th Corp. Slocum inexplicitly does not march to the sound of the guns embracing orders that are out of date and when he pulls into Culps Hill to become the senior commander he seems to lose control of his corps not even knowing the whereabouts of his divisions. Fortunately for the Union, no great attack occurred while 2/3's to the division marched away from their positions to assist the Union Center and left flank and while Geary inexplicitly marched from Culps Hill away from the battle essentially getting lost. Only Greene's division hang's on beating Johnson's dramatic attack in which he out numbered Greene 3 to 1. Slocum's units return at the end of the day. The one piece that would have added an interesting aspect to the essay was how the Confederates just missed out on having over whelming numbers in the attack phase to the point of success. Part of it is explained in that the Stonewall Brigade had to watch a threat from the east but a little more detail would have been wonderful. It sounds that this was the great possibility for a breakthrough while the maligned Longstreet's attack took much of the focus of the Union's attention away.

The last essay by Hartwig is a detailed study of General Caldwell's division filling the breach at the Wheatfield stemming the attack by the First Corp led by Kershaw, Anderson and Semmes. Plugging the hole expertly and timely without any leadership from either Corp commanders on the field. He borrows commands to fill holes in his line and he stymies the Confederate attack until Barksdale and Wofford's brigade ruptures Sickles line collapsing Caldwell's exposed right flank. In spite of high casualties and expert service, Caldwell is castigated by his superiors and eventually loses his command. He's never properly appreciated and perhaps is made inappropriately culpable by his inept Corp commander whose ruthless critique may have been the cover for his own limited performance.

Another essay was needed, what was A. P. Hill doing?

An excellent, thoughtful work for the serious student or researcher. Gallegher seems to have made something of a cottage industry of these edited collections of late, but he does it well. Probably not of much use, however, unless one has a good overall view of the second day, for which I'd recommend Pfanz's work.

Gary Gallagher has brought together the 2nd Day at Gettysburg in a format similar to his 1st Day book in regards to Union and Confederate leadership. This 2nd Day book offers insight to popular questions and accusations made towards officers involved in various battles during the second day of events. As with other publications by Gallagher, Gallagher teams up with other noted historians in a series of chapters that offer their viewpoints to popular battles during the 2nd Day. Gary Gallagher takes on the tough task of questions that arise to Lee's decisions to attack in the early morning of July 2nd, 1863 while William Glenn Robertson tries to answer questions in regards to Daniel Sickle's 3rd Corps movements.

Robertson defines Sickle's with great biography to paint a picture of a man whose military leadership is often backed by political tension and propaganda. Robertson does a fine job in looking at Sickle's reasons for moving the 3rd Corps and also Meade's reaction to such positioning. As the book continues Robert Krick looks at General James Longstreet and tries to answer questions as to why this general was slow to react to Lee's orders on the 2nd how others around the man were upset with his sluggish approach to handling the 2nd day affairs. Krick points out key elements to Longstreet's decision making as it was typical of the commander to be defensive and stubborn throughout the Civil War. It was interesting to read Krick's views on Longstreet's career and how Longstreet handled southern verbal attacks made against him for years after the war.

Wilson Greene brought on his chapter in regards to Howard Slocum's defense of Culp's Hill. Greene initially captured the flavor of Slocum though soon ran into a lengthy discussion of Culp's Hill deployment and battle which did not seem to compliment this chapter's basis of discussion. I felt it painted a good picture of the events though didn't associate with enough impact to Slocum. Slocum I felt became a less-than central figure in the discussion which seemed to lessen the importance of titling the chapter 'Henry J. Slocum and the Twelfth Corps on July 1-2, 1863.' I was disappointed with this chapter.

Scott Hartwig brought on a very intriguing and worthwhile chapter in regards to the Wheatfield which centered on General Caldwell and his command. This was a very refreshing chapter after being bored with Green's Slocum chapter. Hartwig wanted to show that Sickle's blunder had brought about chaos and confusion for other commanders such as Caldwell. Over years Caldwell has taken much blame for his rigid task at hand at the Wheatfield conflict in the 2nd. Hartwig defines the movments and executions carefully with maps and thorough research making this chapter probably the best written of all. It reads well and also shows that Caldwell had a huge undertaking thrust upon him that afternoon on the 2nd and respectively handled a burdensome task.

This book is a great read for those looking to deepen their Gettysburg research. For the novice I would not recommend this book as it does not bring forth the entire 2nd Day battle, it only answers questions popular to 2nd Day events. For the student looking for further insight, I highly recommend this book. It's a must read!!

The Third Day at Gettysburg and Beyond edited by Gary Gallagher is a nice relatively short volume of historiographical works on the last day at Gettysburg and it's immediate aftermath.
The book is not without its problems. In his chapter "Lee's Army Has Not Lost its Prestige" Gallagher asserts that the defeat at Gettysburg was not a crushing defeat for the Confederacy and the defeat at Vicksburg was a much larger defeat for the CSA and its people. While this conclusion is interesting, it's completely at odds with Gallagher's later assertion in his book The Confederate War, that Lee's army was of paramount importance to the people of the CSA. His conclusion that the populace was not as concerned about Gettysburg based upon analysis of letters and diaries needs more study. However, his conclusion that Gen. Lee originally did not regard the defeat at Gettysburg as a crushing blow is well grounded as is his conclusion that Lee's soldiers were not crushed by the defeat which they attributed to the Union army simply having the advantage of better ground and "not fighting a fair fight." Their confidence was certainly not crushed and they believed they did inflict a blow to the Union army in the previous three days fighting.
William Garrett Piston's chapter "Cross Purposes" on Gen. Longstreet and his orders for the final days fighting which ended up causing Lee to order the ill fated, and misnamed, Pickett's charge is also quite interesting. Piston fails to convince however that it was in fact Longstreet not following Lee's orders that caused the disaster. However he does acknowledge ultimate blame falls on Lee for not following through with Longstreet's plan once in motion, he didn't have to order the ill fated charge.
However, after these two chapters the book starts to take a turn and not for the better. Carol Reardon's chapter on Pickett's Charge focuses on the historiographical conflicts waged after the war concerning the responsibility for the failure of the charge. While this is interesting, it really doesn't have much to do with the actual aftermath of the conflict or the charge itself. It only includes a small discussion of which account of the charge and the responsibility for its ultimate failure, is correct.
Perhaps the most interesting chapters are the last two in the book. Robert L. Bee includes the wartime correspondance of Sgt. Ben Hirst's account of the fighting and its aftermath, as well as mentioning his accounts of other battles. Hirst's letters detail the horror of war in a very intense way that brings the action to life for the reader.
A. William Greene conclusively demonstrates that the charges against Gen. Meade of not pursuing Lee after the battle are completely baseless. Bad weather as well as the fact the Confederate army was not as defeated and lacking supplies as Lincoln and many historians after the battle would have one believe, demonstrate had Meade gone after the Confederate army his own army, lacking sleep, food and shoes, would likely have been repulsed on the banks of a swollen Potomac by an angry, well supplied, Confederate Army with many of its soldiers looking for another fight. These charges also ignore that Meade's actual orders were to protect Washington and Baltimore, and force him away from the Federal capital and out of Maryland, not attempt a crushing defeat of Lee which would have taken him and Lee much closer to Washington. Given Lincoln's paranoia about protecting the Federal capital, had Meade spoiled for a fight nearer Washington, Lincoln likely would have criticized him for putting the capital in jeopardy. The consequences of such a battle for the Union had Lee's army been successful would have been desasterous.
Overall, this is a decent historiography that loses its way in the middle with Reardon's chapter and Robert K. Krick's chapter on two Virginia Confederate soldiers. Had those chapters been replaced by ones more germane to the fighting the last day at Gettysburg, this would have been a better book.

Gary Gallagher has assembled an interesting series of essays relating to The High Watermark at Gettysburg and subsequent views of the battle.

The essays vary from excellent to mediocre, as they often are wont to in collections. This is not a long book, but a series of a half-dozen long magazine type pieces on various topics.

Most interesting are writings about the mythology and battles over the memory of Virginia's seminal role in Pickett's Charge. The author gives a very good account of how Virginia writers monopolized the commentary on this most famous of American infantry advances in the decades following the Civil War until it became perceived as an all-Virginia show. This produced resentments and compensating analyses in magazine articles from North Carolina veterans and those from other states eventually in an effort to restore some balance to the memory of that fight and rightfully claim their state's share of the southern glory.

Longstreet's culpability in the delay surrounding the attack on July 3rd and the issue of whether or not Lee gave him preemptory orders the night before is explored as well as the creation of Longstreet as a whipping boy to magnify Lee's memory in the late 1800's. Partly due to payback for Longstreet becoming a Republican and accepting patronage from President Grant, and partly due to the need to shield Lee from what could be shown as a gross error in ordering Pickett's attack, Longstreet was the target of a sustained and vitriolic citique of his role at Gettysburg and in the war. This issue is handled well and presents an interesting monograph on how historic remembrance and war writing can easily turn propagandistic.

Less satisfying is the portrait of a Connecticut soldier who helped turn back Longstreet's advance (actually facing North Carolinian troops beyond the turn in the Angle). The diary entries and the soldier's remembrances of the battle are fascinating. Less so is that author's analysis and attempt to analyze the soldier's psyche and divine his actions or lack thereof by deconstructing his writing.

I also enjoyed a straight-history essay on the pre-Gettysburg careers of Generals Armistead and Garnett. This presented a good picture of pre-war army service as well as fleshing out the careers and background of two of the major participants in Pickett's Charge. (Ironically, Garnett fathered -- and acknowledged -- a son with an Indian woman, but had no problem fighting for a South that viewed humanity through the lens of racial class)

The Army of the Potomac's pursuit of Lee to the Potomac River and Lee's escape in the fortnight after the battle is also examined. The author does a good job of exploring the question of whether or not Meade should have counterattacked on July 3rd, examining the apparent slow pace of the pursuit, Halleck's attempt at exhortation and the not-fought "Battle of Falling Waters" in attempting to bring more clarity to age old questions.

All in all this is an interesting book that should please the Gettysburg fan.

Similar in format to his books covering Day #1 and Day #2 issues, Gary Gallagher has assembled several writer/historians to offer or explain popular concerns of the Day #3 events. Authors offer their views on various subjects such as Confederate morale, Meade's decision to not pursue Lee, Pickett's Charge as a myth and more. Sadly, I did find Robert Krick's essay on Armistead and Garnett to be quite boring and not as useful for the Day #3 events as intended. He liked to cover their military careers while very little was covered about their Gettysburg involvment. I like Krick's work, but felt this essay could have worked in another book.

This book is intended for those who probably already have a good knowledge of the Day #3 events and may have had questions as to popular ideas and concepts of that day. True to the quality of his other books, Gary Gallagher has assembled a very good book with intention to cover these subjects which better explains them. This book is a must read for anyone studying Gettysburg and especially for those who are looking further into the third day fighting. This book won't cover the entire battle as others I would recommend for that. Instead, it focuses on the key issues. 5 STARS!!!!!

Being a fan of Mark Nesbitt's Ghost of Gettysburg book series I was sold on the idea of reading his new book that told of two soldiers of opposing armies brought together at Gettysburg. Nesbitt's approach to telling the diaries of two soldiers written on similar dates was a great idea though I found that the Union story of Private Horner lacked the details compared to his opposition Confederate Private Ware. Ware's details seem to blur Horner's quick and rather limited writing. Both soldiers certainly write about the marching and battle while Nesbitt tries to balance army movements with historical backing and concepts. I found the maps helpful but often hard to follow because they were photos of very detailed maps that made things hard to read in black and white. Had they been less of detail or re-drawn for the book as other history books it would have been much easier to comprehend. As much as I am a fan of Nesbitt's work I found myself reading this book and wanting more detail as the book is a very quick read. I would have liked to give this book 3.5 Stars though Amazon's rating system doesn't allow for halves.

I really liked this book. This book is great for people who like history. This book is about two men and their diaries. The book is also about the battle of Gettysburg.

35 Days To Gettysburg: The Campaign Diaries Of Two American Enemies by Civil War enthusiast Mark Nesbitt features the daily journal entries of two ordinary soldiers caught up in the American Civil War: Thomas Lewis Ware, a Confederate from rural Georgia; and Franklin Horner, a Union soldier from Pennsylvania coal land. Their various perspectives and recorded experiences (sometimes conflicting, sometimes all too parallel), lead up to one of the bloodiest battles in the entire four year conflict, are vividly recounted with meticulous notes and a comprehensive index in this truly fascinating compilation. 35 Days To Gettysburg is a superbly presented primary source offering an up-close and personal a view of America's deadliest war, and a truly welcome and much appreciated contribution to the growing library of American Civil War studies.

This book perpetuates the out and out LIES surrounding the Gettysburg address.

This quote says it all...

"The Gettysburg speech was at once the shortest and the most famous oration in American history... the highest emotion reduced to a few poetical phrases. Lincoln himself never even remotely approached it. It is genuinely stupendous. But let us not forget that it is poetry, not logic; beauty, not sense. Think of the argument in it.

Put it into the cold words of everyday.

The doctrine is simply this: that the Union soldiers who died at Gettysburg sacrificed their lives to the cause of self-determination -- that government of the people, by the people, for the people, should not perish from the earth.

It is difficult to imagine anything more untrue.

The Union soldiers in the battle actually fought *against* self-determination; it was the Confederates who fought for the right of their people to govern themselves."--

As Gary Willis tries to indicate in his introduction to this illustrated edition of Lincoln's "Gettysburg Address," the reason it is the most important speech in American History is because until Lincoln made his few choice "remarks" at the dedication of the National Cemetery at Gettysburg, Americans did not believe the principle that "all men are created equal" that is enshrined in the Declaration of Independence. So while this is a sense that the Union Troops did not fight for self-determination, or to free the slaves for that matter, we now believe that they did and we do so because of what Lincoln said at Gettysburg (Willis develops this argument more comprehensively in his Pulitzer Prize-winning book, "Lincoln at Gettysburg"). This is what historicans mean when they talk about how Lincoln elevated the war to a higher level.

The speech is only 272 words long and is illustrated with a dozen marvelously detailed etchings by Michael McCurdy (he calls them drawings in his afterword, but since they are white on black I think of them as "etchings"). McCurdy depicts not only Lincoln speaking at Gettysburg, but also the actual battle and Lincoln's idealized vision of America. If students do not have the opportunity to hear "The Gettysburg Address" read out loud the first time they encounter it, then this book is a reasonable substitute for the experience.

I read this book aloud to my children. The text is simply the Gettysburg address, broken into phrases with an illustration for each thought. Two-thirds of the way through the book, I found myself weeping. The combination of Lincoln's eloquence and the illustrations touched me. I would recommend using this book to introduce students of any age to Lincoln's famous speech and the history associated with it.